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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF rfHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE LAND BOARD, 
Plainti If-Respondent, 
-vs-
STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
FISH AND GAME 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10154 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant has appealed from a decision of the Dis-
trict Court in the Third Judicial District, the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, finding that the State Land 
Board was entitled to deposits of sand and gravel on certain 
lands in eastern Utah, that the State Land Board had the 
power to lease and dispose of the sand and gravel without 
the consent of the State Department of Fish and Game, 
and determining that Section 65-7-10, U.C.A. 1953, did 
not limit the Land Board's power to lease or otherwise dis-
pose of minerals in accordance with its otherwise recog-
nized statutory powers. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The respondent State Land Board filed suit in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, against the State 
Department of Fish and Game, claiming that certain sand 
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and gravel deposits on a section of land in eastern Utah 
were, by virtue of the provisions of 65-1-15 and 16, U. C.A. 
1953, reserved to the State Land Board and under its con-
trol and management. Respondent sought a declaratory 
judgment quieting its right, title, and interest in the sand 
and gravel in and on the subject lands. The Department 
of Fish and Game filed an answer, denying that the sand 
and gravel in the subject lands were mineral, and by way of 
affirmative defense, alleged that even if the sand and gravel 
were mineral so as to be reserved to the State Land Board, 
the consent of the Department of Fish and Game was re-
quired prior to lease or other lawful disposition. A motion 
for summary judgment was filed by the respondent and 
judgment entered in favor of the respondent and against 
the appellant on the 23rd day of April, 1964. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the decision of the District Court 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of facts 
as being a more correct statement of the evidence actually 
before the District Court and the record on appeal and with 
being in accord with the principle of law that the evidence 
on appeal will be reviewed in the light most favorable to 
the trial court's decision. 
On July 19, 1926, the State Land Board sold the follow-
ing described land: Section 32, Township 3 South, Range 
25 East, S.L.M., Utah. The lands are situated in Uintah 
County, and were sold to Henry H. Ruple of Vernal, Utah 
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). The Certificate of Sale contained 
the following reservation : 
"Reserving to the State of Utah, all coal and other 
minerals, in the above lands, and to it, or persons 
authorized by it the right to prospect for, mine and 
remove coal and other minerals from the same, upon 
compliance with the condition and subject to the limi-
tations of Chapter 1 07, Session Laws 1919, as amended 
Session Laws 1921." 
Subsequently, on March 18, 1946, then Governor Her-
bert B. Maw issued a patent to Lilly Ruple, covering the 
subject lands and containing the same reservation (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 2) . Subsequently, the lands were acquired and 
are at the present time held by the appellant Utah State 
Department of Fish and Game, subject to the reservations 
contained in the original Certificate of Sale and patent, 
and further subject to the statutory reservations of minerals 
reserved in the sale of State lands, as provided under Sec-
tion 65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953 (R. 41). 
On January 27, 1964, the Director of the Department 
of Fish and Game advised the Land Board that it did not 
consider the sand and gravel deposits on the subject lands 
to be mineral, and that it did not consent to the issuance 
of any lease on the subject lands (.Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
Subsequently the respondent filed the instant action, alleg-
ing that the sand and gravel deposits on the subject lands 
were reserved by the Land Board at the time of the original 
sale to Mr. Ruple. The Land Board contended that the 
sand and gravel deposits were "minerals" within the statu-
tory and patent reservations. In answer, the State Depart-
ment of Fish and Game denied that the sand and gravel 
deposits were minerals within the meaning of the reserva-
tions, and pled that even assuming they are, consent of the 
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Department of Fish and Game to any disposition was neces-
sary prior to leasing ( R. 5 ) . 
At the time of hearing on motion for summary judg-
ment, it was stipulated between the parties: 
"MR. BOYCE: * * * that there are deposits of a geo-
logical substance on the plaintiff's lands known as sand 
and gravel and these substances are in such quantity 
and such quality as to be economically and commer-
cially usable, and that they can be extracted from the 
subject lands by normal processes of quarrying, which 
is a normal means of recovery in the State of Utah. 
"MR. DEWSNUP: I think that defendant would 
stipulate essentially to that, but on such a proviso that 
if the sand and gravel present on this particular prop-
erty were located in an area where there would be a 
very near use so that there would be no particular haul 
as far as distance was concerned, it would be commer-
cially feasible. But this I would deny, it would be feasi-
ble to haul these substances at great distance. But cer-
tainly if this land were located in Salt Lake County 
the sand and gravel on it could be considered to be 
commercially usable. 
"MR. BOYCE: I would agree with that, but there are 
limitations which are normally attendant to any proc-
ess of removing sand and gravel, being their economic 
marketing. I would merely ask the Court to take judi-
cial knowledge of the economic population conditions 
in the area where these lands are located." (R. 43, 44.) 
Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, it is obvious 
from the stipulation of the parties that the sand and gravel 
deposits are present in commercial quantities on the sub-
ject lands, limited only by economic demand. However, 
since it is obvious that the dispute between the Department 
of Fish and Game and the State Land Board is over the 
proposed disposition of the sand and gravel, a demand 
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market for the product does obviously exist. Based upon 
the above evidence, the trial court entered judgment for 
the respondent as prayed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SAND AND GRAVEL DEPOSITS ON THE SUBJECT 
LANDS ARE MINERALS WITHIN THE MEANING OF 65-1-
15 AND 16, U.C.A. 1953, AND THE RESERVATIONS CON-
TAINED IN THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE AND PATENT 
COVERED THE SUBJECT LANDS. 
65-1-15, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"All coal and other mineral deposited in lands be-
longing to the state of Utah are hereby reserved to the 
state. Such deposits are reserved from sale, except on 
a rental and royalty basis as provided by law, and the 
purchaser of any lands belonging to the state shall 
acquire no right, title or interest in or to such deposits, 
but the rights of such purchaser shall be subject to the 
reservation of all coal and other mineral deposits, and 
to the conditions and limitations prescribed by law 
providing for the state and persons authorized by it to 
prospect or mine, and to remove such deposits, and to 
occupy and use so much of the surface of said lands as 
may be required for all purposes reasonably incident 
to the mining and removal of such deposits therefrom; 
*** 
"Salts and other minerals in the waters of navigable 
lakes and streams are likewise reserved to the state and 
shall be sold by the state land board only upon royalty 
basis. * * *" 
65-1-16, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"All applications to purchase, approved subsequent 
to May 12 1919, shall be subject to a reservation to 
the state of all coal and other mineral deposits in said 
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lands, with the right to the state or persons authorized 
by it to prospect for, mine and remove the same as pro-
vided by law, and all certificates of sale and all patents 
issued therefor shall contain such reservation." 
Both these sections were enacted prior to the time the 
State Land Board made any disposition of the subject lands. 
Laws of Utah, 1919, Ch. 107, § 1. 
From the above sections it is clear that the Legislature 
intended to reserve all mineral resource in State lands that 
may be valuable. The support of the common schools was 
best served by such a reservation. The fact that the Legisla-
ture has sought to mention salts of navigable lakes and 
streams makes it rather obvious that the Legislature in-
tended a broad definition of minerals, and since sand and 
gravel when recoverable in commercial quantities clearly 
fit into that category, the trial court's determination that 
the sand and gravel in the subject lands was reserved is 
clearly correct. 
Further, in addition to the statutory limitations above 
mentioned, the reservations placed in the patent and cer-
tificate of sale issued by the Land Board evidence an intent 
to carry out the statutory mandate to its fullest extent. 
Mineral 
It is, of course, obvious that whether the sand and gravel 
involved in this lawsuit is reserved to the Land Board or is 
held by the Department of Fish and Game depends upon 
what is encompassed by the term "mineral" as it is used in 
65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953, and the patent and cer-
tificate of sale reservations, which are obviously included 
to implement the statute. 
The question of what substances are mineral and what 
substances are non-mineral has been treated by the Utah 
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courts in a fairly definitive fashion. In Nephi Plaster and 
.\fanufacturing Co. v. juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 Pac. 
53 ( 1907), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that gypsum, 
which bears geological similarities to sand gravel, is a min-
eral. The court ruled that mines and minerals were not 
limited to subterranean excavations nor to metalliferous 
deposits. The court cited with approval the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. 
v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 ( 1903), where the Supreme 
Court held that granite quarries were mineral in character. 
It was argued in the Nephi Plaster case, which concerned 
the taxability of certain substances, that the constitution 
defining taxable minerals should be construed on the basis 
of the ejusdem generis rule. The provision and statute in 
question bore similarity to 65-1-16, U.C.A. 1953, which 
was subsequently adopted in 1919. The court rejected the 
contention that ejusdem generis was applicable, and indi-
cated that the construction of the statute was such that the 
Legislature could not have contemplated the application of 
the ejusdem generis or other limiting rule. The court stated: 
"* * * From the foregoing it thus seems clear to us 
that where we find the terms 'mines and minerals' used 
in grants or in reservations, in instruments of convey-
ance, in statutes or constitutions, under the modern 
construction the former is not limited to mere sub-
terranean excavations or workings, nor is the latter 
limited to the metals or metalliferous deposits, whether 
contained in veins that have well-defined walls or in 
beds or deposits that are irregular and are found at or 
near the surface or otherwise." 
lnDeseret Livestock Co. v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 
401 ( 1946) , this court considered the question of whether 
salt in solution was a mineral. The court quoted from 36 
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Am. Jur., Mines and Minerals, Section 4, and adopted the 
accepted legal definition of minerals contained therein. The 
court stated: 
"***'Accordingly a number of authorities prefer 
to define a "mineral" as any natural substance having 
sufficient value to be mined, quarried, or extracted for 
its own sake or its own specific use.' Under this defini-
tion it is apparent that the salt found in the waters of 
Great Salt Lake because of its quantity is a 'mineral' 
and is valuable for its own sake." 
Further, the court stated: 
"Under the Federal mining statutes and the rulings 
of the courts, the word 'minerals' includes not only 
such valuable metals as gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, 
copper, and iron, but also such varied substances as 
agate, diamonds, coal, asphaltum, petroleum, natural 
gas, shale, granite, limestone, marble, slate, feldspar, 
fluor spar, building sand, gypsum, silica rock, paint 
stone, borax, sulphur, alum, carbonate and nitrate of 
soda, water, saline springs and deposits, etc." 
It is apparent, therefore, that Utah precedent has 
adopted the position that, if the substance under con-
sideration is sufficiently valuable to be sought for its own 
sake apart from the soil, the substance may be deemed 
mineral. Accepting this well established definition as the 
premise, it is apparent that sand and gravel is a mineral 
within that definition. 
Geological Evidence 
Volume III, 1963, Minerals Yearbook, Area Reports, 
page 1080, notes that in the year 1963 there was produced 
in Utah sand and gravel of a value of $20,954,000. This 
clearly evidences the fact that sand and gravel, when found 
in sufficient quantity and quality to be commercially mar-
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ketable, satisfies the definition of mineral noted in the above 
cases. 
In i\lineral and Water Resources of Utah, Bulletin 73, 
1964, published by the Utah Geological and Mineralogical 
Survey, it is noted: 
"Sand and gravel deposits consist of unconsolidated 
rock fragments which have been moved and sorted by 
natural processes so that most of the finer and very 
coarse fragments have been separated from them. 
Sand and gravel are widely used in the construction 
industry because they provide strength, durability, and 
bulk at low unit cost. Because they are so abundant, 
so universally used, and relatively low priced, their 
mineral resource value has not always been fully ap-
preciated. * * * 
"The large quantities of sand and gravel used in 
the State reflect the abundant supply of high quality 
material available to the consumer at low cost. Much 
of the material can be used with minimum screening, 
washing, and crushing; transportation costs are mini-
mal because of the proximity of many source areas to 
transportation facilities and to the principal users. 
*** 
"The market for sand and gravel has progressively 
expanded up to the present and will probably continue 
to increase in the future, particularly in the expanding 
urban areas. The resources of sand and gravel are 
ample to supply the market in the foreseeable future. 
Large construction projects, such as the Flaming 
Gorge Dam, make large but temporary demands on 
normally little developed deposits away from the large 
urban areas. Much of the material in the eastern and 
southern parts of the State is in presently inaccessible 
canyons. Locally, some sand and gravel deposits are 
becoming unavailable for use in some of the rapidly 
expanding urban areas. In such areas, more expensive 
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crushed rock, lightweight aggregate, or other materials 
may partially supplant sand and gravel in the con-
struction industry." 
It is apparent from this that sand and gravel have a high 
commercial value in Utah when it is found in sufficient 
quantity and quality as to be commercially usable. Further, 
it is apparent that valuable deposits of sand and gravel are 
rather well defined in Utah and are certainly considered 
mineral by geologists and mineralogists. 
Further, it is well settled that sand and gravel in general 
have a recognized industrial mineral worth. In Industrial 
Minerals and Rocks, 3rd Ed., (Mudd Series), it is stated: 
"Sand and gravel together constitute the mineral 
raw materials of largest volume produced from the 
earth. In 1958, as reported by the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines, 680,080,000 tons of sand and gravel (including 
industrial sand) were produced in the United States. 
The nearest competitor was crushed rock of which 
532,818,000 tons were produced. Coal, both bitumi-
nous and anthracite accounted for only 431,616,689 
tons in the same year. In dollar value, sand and gravel 
were exceeded only by cement, crushed rock and fuels. 
Hence it is a major unit of the mineral-producing in-
dustry. As an example, one plant in California oper-
ates around the clock at an average rate of 1,500 tons 
per hour, and at peak intervals has shipped over 4,000 
tons per hour, all by trucks. Nevertheless, it is con-
trolled by one man through a panel of push buttons 
that control the crushing, screening, washing, grading, 
stock piling, and reclaiming of the products." 
Further, contrary to some opinions, it is apparent that 
there are definitive geological specifications defining sand 
and gravel, and that the industry has reached a rather 
sophisticated standard of determining the value of sand 
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and gravel deposits ancl identifying the length and depth of 
sand and gravel beds. Industrial Minerals and Rocks, supra, 
739, 741. 
Further, geologists, although defining sand and gravel 
as consisting of "continuously graded unconsolidated ma-
terials," clearly recognize that commercial sand and gravel 
deposits are generally classified geologically into four cate-
gories, and have been able to define with substantial speci-
ficity the geological and mineralogical qualities of com-
mercial sand and gravel, such that persons reasonably 
acquainted with the substance have definite standards for 
determining what in fact is sand and gravel as distinct from 
worthless alluvium. 
Further, there are definite recognized forms of mining, 
quarrying, and dredging sand and gravel, and the process-
ing and manufacturing involves sophisticated plant design 
and processing. Industrial Minerals and Rocks, 745, 758. 
See also Bates, Geology of the Industrial Rocks and Min-
erals, Ch. 5, p. 82 ( 1960) . 
There is no question that sand and gravel have recog-
nizable characteristics such that when found in sufficient 
quantity to be commercially valuable, are clearly recogniz-
able from other earth substances and from the soil itself. 
Thus, in Mineral Facts and Problems, Bulletin 585, (Bu-
reau of Mines 1960), p. 706, it is stated: 
"~Iethods of formation and deposition have im-
parted physical characteristics to sands and gravels 
that largely determine the commercial value for a par-
ticular use and influence the manner of exploitation. 
* * *" 
This same work supports the position that sand and 
gravel is an identifiable geological mineral which has sub-
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stantial worth in commercial industry. It is further recog-
nized that extracting processes are such that sand and 
gravel is recoverable by recognized mining techniques. 
Mineral Facts and Problems, supra, 706, 707. 
Therefore, from what has been noted above as to the 
geological and mineralogical aspects of sand and gravel, it 
is apparent that this substance, when related to the judicial 
test laid down in the Nephi Plaster and Deseret Livestock 
cases, supra, is mineral, depending upon the quantity and 
quality of the deposit. In the instant case it is stipulated 
by the parties that the sand and gravel present upon the 
subject lands is in such quantities and of such quality as to 
be commercially minable and marketable. It is obvious, 
therefore, that under any reasonable definition of mineral 
- judicial, mineralogical, or industrial- the present de-
posits must be deemed mineral and hence encompassed 
within the statutory reservation. 
Opinion of Attorney General. 
The appellant relies in part for its contention that sand 
and gravel is not a mineral within the reservation provi-
sions of 65-1-15 and 16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, on 
an opinion of the Attorney General ( 55-088, Biennial Re-
port 1956, page 166), wherein the Attorney General ruled 
that sand and gravel was not mineral. It is submitted that 
the appellant can take no comfort from this contention. 
There is no evidence before the court that the Land Board 
ever relied upon the opinion of the Attorney General in 
advancing or relinquishing any claims to sand and gravel 
deposits. To the contrary, the fact that the instant con ... 
troversy is before the court itself rebuts the contention that 
the Land Board has followed the interpretation of the At-
torney General. Consequently, there is no long history of 
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administrative interpretation or legislative acquiescence 
in such interpretation which would support a conclusion 
that the provisions of 65-1-15 and 16 intended to exclude 
sand and gravel from the definition of mineral. 
Further, the opinion of the Attorney General, it is re-
spectfully submitted, lacks any real substance. First, the 
opinion did not consider a definition of the term "mineral" 
nor did the opinion mention or consider the application of 
theN ephi Plaster case, supra, or the Deseret Livestock case, 
supra. The opinion cited cases not involving legislative 
enactments but construction of reservation clauses in deeds. 
It is obvious that there is a substantial difference between 
the intention of the parties to a deed where they are dealing 
with specific parcels of land and the intention of a legisla-
ture providing for a broad policy that would reserve the 
mineral wealth of the state for the common schools. In the 
latter case, no specific parcels of land were involved but 
rather an intent to encompass the broadest form of the 
definition of the term "mineral" so that the wealth existing 
is state lands, which has worth separate and apart from the 
agricultural uses of the land, shall be reserved for the com-
mon schools. It is submitted that it was the intention of the 
Utah Legislature to define the term "mineral" as broad as 
possible. This is evidenced by three factors in 65-1-15, 
U.C.A. 1953. First, the term "salts" is used with reference 
to other minerals, evidences a legislative awareness that 
the term mineral is not limited to subterranean material or 
metalliferous ores. Second, the language of 65-1-15 totally 
prohibits the State from alienating its mineral interests, thus 
evidencing an across-the-board policy applicable to all min-
erals. Third, the only area which the Legislature excepted 
from the reservation of minerals to the State in any sale 
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of lands was where the lands were "improved farm lands," 
thus indicating that where the primary purpose for acquisi-
tion of the land was agricultural and where the predomi-
nant use of the lands would be for farming, inconsistent 
mineral uses should not be allowed. This indicates that the 
Legislature intended that the term mineral be distinct from 
agricultural, thus giving the term "mineral" the broadest 
possible construction. Consequently, it is apparent that 
there are several weaknesses to the above mentioned Attor-
ney General's opinion. 
It is noteworthy that subsequently, the Attorney Gen-
eral was asked to pass upon the question of whether clay 
would be deemed to be reserved as a mineral within the 
statutory reservations. In that opinion ( 56-07 5, Biennial 
Report 1958, page 189) , 1 the Attorney General answered 
in the affirmative and expressly mentioned both the Deseret 
Livestock case and the Nephi Plaster case, and relied upon 
at least one early decision of the Department of Interior 
(Aldritt v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 25 L.D. 349). 
The Attorney General concluded that since clay was valu-
able in its own right, apart from the agricultural and soil 
usages, it would be deemed mineral within the definition of 
mineral as adopted by prior Utah cases. Subsequently, the 
Attorney General ruled that volcanic cinders were reserved 
as minerals (57 -031, Biennial Report 1958, page 195) . 
There is no rational basis for saying that if volcanic cinders 
and clay are to be deemed minerals because they are valu-
able in their own right, defined sand and gravel deposits of 
commercial worth, which are also valuable in their own 
right, are not mineral. Consistency of definition, both legal 
and mineralogical, requires a determination that sand and 
1 This opinion was apparently written by a different assistant attorney general. 
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gravel under such circumstances be classified as mineral. 
Consequently, the subsequent opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral and the very shallow reasoning of the first opinion 
would seem to attest to the correctness of the trial court's 
decision in the instant case and give no support to the ap-
pellant's position. 
judicial Construction. 
The cases which have considered the question of whether 
sand and gravel is mineral within the terms of particular 
statutes or deeds are in hopeless confusion. A great num-
ber of the cases turn on the particular intention of the par-
ties as respects ( 1 ) particular land or ( 2 ) the purpose of the 
initial conveyance. However, in 95 A.L.R.2d 846, it is 
noted: 
"It is the general rule that a conveyance or excep-
tion of 'minerals' in a deed, lease, or license includes 
all mineral substances which can be taken from the 
land, and that, in order to restrict the meaning of the 
term, there must be qualifying words or language in-
dicating that the parties contemplated something less 
general than all substances legally cognizable as min-
erals. Either as an application of the above rule gen-
erally, or by way of a specific statement consistent with 
it, the * * * cases support the viewpoint that the term 
'mineral' or 'minerals,' as used in real-property instru-
ments which have been judicially construed, includes 
clay, sand, or gravel, at least in the absence of other 
language indicative of a different intention." 
Admittedly, there are cases to the contrary. However, 
these cases are not helpful in the construction of the term 
"mineral reservations" as respects the public domain. 
Thus, the three cases relied upon by the Attorney General's 
opinion, heretofore mentioned and cited by the appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
in its brief, do not involve questions of the construction of 
statutory reservation clauses governing the public domain. 
In Beck v. Harvey, 196 Okla. 270, 164 P.2d 399 ( 1944 ), 
the court rejected the contention that sand and gravel was 
included within a mineral reservation. The reservation 
reserved a "one fourth mineral royalty." The court felt that 
the deed reserving the mineral royalty did not contemplate 
that sand and gravel be covered. The court noted that oil 
and gas was the usual substance in which a mineral royalty 
was reserved. 2 The court quoted from a previous case which 
had applied the ejusdem generis rule and determined that 
sand and gravel was not a mineral as that term was con-
templated by the parties. The case of State v. Hendrix, 196 
Okla. 596, 167 P.2d 43 ( 1946), applied the Beck rule where 
the reservation was "* * * in and to all of the oil, petroleum, 
gas coal, asphalt and all other minerals of every kind or 
character in and under, and that may be produced from 
certain lands***." This case also involved a private-party 
conveyance and the court in applying the ejusdem generis 
rule of the Beck case excluded sand and gravel. It is appar-
ent, therefore, that since the Nephi Plaster case rejected 
the application of the ejusdem generis rule to the same 
language as is used in 65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953, these 
cases are not precedent to the instant problem. They in-
volve the construction of specific deeds and specific parcels 
of land and not the broad legislative policy of a state en-
deavoring to protect its mineral wealth for the use of the 
common schools. The same is true in Farrell v. Sayre, 129 
Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 ( 1954). 
It is submitted that the better reasoned and more rele-
vant cases and authorities have found sand and gravel to be 
2 To this extent the court was notoriously naive as mineral royalties are usually 
payable on any substance extracted under a mining contract. 
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a mineral in situations comparable to this one. In 36 Am. 
Jur., Mines and Minerals, Section 5, it is stated: 
"Under the Federal mining statutes and the rulings 
of the courts, the word 'minerals' includes not only such 
valuable metals as gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, 
copper, and iron, but also such varied substances as 
* * * fluorspar, building sand, gypsum, silica rock, 
paint stone,***." 
In 58 C.J.S., Mines and Minerals, Section 2 ( 3), it is gen-
erally stated: 
"In a broad sense, gravel and sand may be con-
sidered minerals; but in a commercial sense they may 
or may not be minerals, according to the circumstances 
under which the terms are used." 
With respect to the quoted statement from Corpus Juris 
Secundum, it should be borne in mind that it has been stipu-
lated between the parties that the sand and gravel in de-
posit on the subject lands is of such a nature as to be com-
mercially useable and profitable. 
In Watkins v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 231 S.W.2d 
981, the court noted that sand and gravel, if it has sufficient 
worth to be commercially marketable, would be deemed 
mineral within the terms of a deed reserving minerals. In 
Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Rr. Co., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 488, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly recognized the 
definition of mineral as being "any inorganic substance 
found in nature, having sufficient value, separated from its 
situs as part of the earth, to be mined, quarried or dug for 
its own sake or its own specific uses." This definition is simi-
lar to that adopted by the Utah cases. The court stated that 
if common building sand 'vas of sufficient commercial value 
to be mined in its own right, it would be deemed mineral 
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but if the sand were merely an indistinguishable part of the 
surface, having only limited and sporatic use, it would not 
be deemed mineral. It was the position of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court that the Legislature, in enacting the statute 
which was in question, intended to protect the commercial 
interests in the land, and whether sand or gravel would be 
deemed mineral would be determined by the economic 
aspect of the question. Thus, the Hendler case recognized 
that sand and gravel could be mineral where it was present 
in commercial quantity and quality. 
In Matthews v. Department of Conservation, 355 Mich. 
589, 96 N.W.2d 160, the Michigan Supreme Court con-
cerned itself with a question very similar to that involved in 
the instant case. The Michigan statute in question reserved 
to the state all minerals. The Michigan Supreme Court 
ruled that minerals would include metallic and nonmetallic 
substances and that sand and gravel, being a nonmetallic 
substance of substantial worth, would be deemed a mineral 
within the reservation in the Michigan statute. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court noted that the reservation would in-
clude sand and gravel even though the lands were sold for 
agricultural purposes. The court felt that it was the inten-
tion of the legislature to reserve to the state all interests in 
the land, mineral in character, having substantial value 
a part from agricultural uses. 
In Loney v. Scott, 57 Ore. 378, 112 Pac. 172 ( 1910), the 
Oregon Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether 
or not sand or gravel was a mineral within the meaning of 
32 Stat. 388, allowing placer mining locations under the 
federal mining laws governing the public domain. The 
Oregon Supreme Court determined that sand and gravel 
was a mineral. The court stated: 
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"The question arises whether building sand is a 
mineral, within the mineral laws of the United States. 
The language of section 2329 is: 'Claims usually called 
"placers," including all forms of deposits, excepting 
veins of quartz, or other rock in place, shall be subject 
to entry.' Plaintiffs' proof tends to show that building 
sand is a valuable mineral, viz., worth 50 cents per 
cubic yard, and is marketable in large quantities. 
George Otis Smith, the director of the United States 
Geological Survey, in volume 2 of his Report of the 
Mineral Resources of the United States, for 1907, at 
page 563, by a tabulated statement shows that more 
than $5,000,000 worth of building sand had been pro-
duced in the United States in 1906, and as great a 
value in 1907. 
"In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 
526, 534, 23 Sup. Ct. 365, 368 ( 47 L.Ed. 575), the 
court, in discussing whether granite comes within the 
term, 'mineral deposit,' says: 'The words, "valuable 
mineral deposits" (as used in section 2319, U.S. Rev. 
St. [U.S. Comp. St.1901, p.1424] should be construed 
as including all lands chiefly valuable for other than 
agricultural purposes, and particularly as including 
nonmetallic substances [naming a list, and continu-
ing]. We do not deem it necessary to attempt an exact 
definition of the word "mineral lands" as used in the 
act of July 2, 1864 [Act June 2, 1864, c. 217, 13 Stat. 
365]. With our present light upon the subject it might 
be difficult to do so. * * * Indeed, we are of the opinion 
that this legislation consists with, rather than opposes, 
the overwhelming weight of authority to the effect 
that mineral lands include, not merely metalliferous 
lands, but all such as are chiefly valuable for their 
deposits of a mineral character, which are useful in the 
arts or valuable for purposes of manufacture.' This 
definition seems broad enough to include building 
sand, and we are of the opinion that land more valu-
able for the building sand it contains than for agri-
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culture is subject to placer location, and is mineral 
within the meaning of the United States mining 
statutes." 
A position similar to that of the State of Oregon was 
taken in State v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219,89 Pac. 565 ( 1907), 
by the Washington Supreme Court. The court expressly 
rejected the contention that mineral should be limited to 
commonly recognized metalliferous substances and noted 
substantial early precedence indicating that paint stone, 
building stone, gypsum, resin, guano, mica, etc. had been 
determined to be mineral. Both the Oregon and Washing-
ton Supreme Courts were impressed with the broad defini-
tion of minerals adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 
( 1903). In that case, the United States Supreme Court 
held that granite quarries were mineral in character and 
that the lands where the granite was located would be 
mineral lands within the meaning of the laws enacted by 
Congress. In doing so, the court recognized that Congress 
had greatly refined the definition of minerals from earlier 
laws and felt that mineral included lands chiefly valuable 
for stone and that metallic ores were not the limit of the 
term mineral. The court stated: 
"* * * Indeed, we are of the opinion that this legis-
lation consists with, rather than opposes, the over-
whelming weight of authority to the effect that min-
eral lands include not merely metalliferous lands, but 
all such as are chiefly valuable for their deposits of a 
mineral character, which, are useful in the arts or valu-
able for purposes of manufacture." 
In Puget Mill Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wash. 2d 421,96 P.2d 571 
( 1939), the Washington Supreme Court noted that the 
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term miner~ls, depending on its construction, could either 
be limited to metallic substances or embrace sand and 
gravel. See also LaRowe v. McGee, 171 Ga. 771, 156 S.E. 
591; Tennessee Valley Authority v. Harris, 115 Fed. 2d 343 
(5th Cir. 1940). In Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 168, 109 
So. 2d 628 ( 1959), the Mississippi court ruled that the par-
ties intended to include bentonite and other similar non-
metallic substances. Accord: Cole v. Berry, 245 Miss. 359, 
147 So. 2d 306. In the United States v. Aitkin, 25 Philip-
pines 7 ( 1913), the court ruled that sand and gravel and 
clay could be deemed minerals as that term was used in 
common instruments. The court said that whether the ma-
terial was or was not mineral would be based upon its com-
mercial uses and that if it was present in such quantity and 
quality as to be commercially useable and identifiable in 
such quantity as to distinguish it from the soil. If such cir-
cumstances existed sand and gravel could be deemed min-
eral. The court found that the clay was present in such 
quantity, but that sand and gravel was not. 
The Loney case, cited above, from Oregon is of substan-
tial weight since it was decided prior to the time the mineral 
reservation was enacted by the Utah Legislature. Further, 
it considered the definition of mineral as the term was used 
on the public domain. Equally important was the deci-
sion of Northern Pacific Ry. v. Soderberg, supra, where the 
United States Supreme Court indicated that building stone 
and other nonmetallic substances would be deemed mineral 
as respects their use on the public domain. 
In Bumpus v. United States~ 325 F.2d 264 (lOth Cir. 
1963), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that 
the word "mineral" does not have a definite meaning but 
may be used in many senses and that the construction to be 
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given to the term must depend upon the purposes sought or 
the intention of the parties, as the case may be. In that 
case, although the court ruled that gravel was not included 
within a condemnation instrument, it did so by applying the 
ejusdem generis rule, a rule not applicable to the instant 
case by virtue of this court's decision in the Nephi Plaster 
case. 
In the recent case of United States v. Schaub, 163 U.S. 
875 (DC Alaska, 1958), the court ruled that sand and 
gravel was a mineral under the Mining Law of 1872 (30 
U.S.C.A., Sec. 222), where the material was valuable for 
commercial purposes. The court ruled that the defendants 
had a valid mining location where the sand and gravel was 
useable for commercial purposes although not of a par-
ticularly high value. The court adopted the general public 
domain rule that "whatever is recognized as mineral by 
standard authorities on the subject where the same is found 
in quantities and quality to render the land*** more valu-
able" would be deemed mineral. The court stated: 
"Although the sand and gravel located by the de-
fendants may be of a coarse variety, there is nothing 
explicit or implicit within the mining statutes requir-
ing mineral deposits to be useful for special purposes. 
Sand and gravel of the type sought to be located by the 
defendants is relatively scarce in Alaska, and being 
such, are items of value in themselves. Their property 
characteristics are far more suitable for building pur-
poses than the type to be found close to or on the coast, 
due to chemical composition of coastal substances. In 
this sense, the sand and gravel in question is of a su-
perior type. There is no doubt that the land contain-
ing the sand and gravel was greatly appreciated in 
value attributable to its presence. No reason can be 
found to exist to warrant a distinguishing of gravel 
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from other deposits used for a similar purpose which 
the Land Department has consistently upheld as being 
within the purview of the Act of 1872. The statute 
makes express reference to 'valuable mineral deposits.' 
The use of such deposits and their demand are helpful 
only so far as they determine valuation. Mineral de-
posits may be just as valuable for one purpose as 
another, and because a deposit may be limited in its 
use only for one purpose, there is no reason to deny 
application of the Act of 1872 if the deposit is valu-
able and can be marketed at a profit. There is no dis-
pute that the sand and gravel were chiefly valuable for 
road building and concrete mix. But, if the lands con-
taining these deposits were as valuable and yielded 
profits comparable to lands containing high-grade 
sand suitable for glass-making, and the latter would 
come within the Act of 1872, no distinction can be 
conceived that would justify a different result. 
"At the time of the passage of the Act of 1872, a 
great deal of the lands were unexplored. It would be 
a far stretch of the imagination to assume that Con-
gress intended to limit the mining laws only to those 
minerals known to possess a great value at the time 
the statute was enacted, where the express intent of 
Congress was to develop the mining resources of the 
United States, so as to give value to a greater number 
of things in the promotion of manufacturing and the 
arts. To stimulate the growth of our country, Con-
gress encouraged mining activities, and in doing so, 
intended that substances that can be taken from the 
earth and marketed at a profit, be subjected to the 
application of the mining laws. 
"Therefore, under the mining laws in effect when 
the entry herein was made, such entry was valid and 
the government's claims should be denied." 
It is apparent, therefore, that the better reasoned cases 
and the cases applying the definition of mineral to the pub-
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lie domain have found sand and gravel to be included 
within the definition of mineral where there was a com-
mercial use to which the substance could be put. 
Early decisions of the Department of Interior and the 
courts supported the position that nonmetalliferous sub-
stances could be deemed sand and gravel. In W. H. Hooper, 
1 L.D. 560, and H. P. Bennet, ]r., 3 L.D. 116 ( 1884), grav-
elly soil and granite was considered mineral within the pur-
view of the Mining Act of 1872. In Freezer v. Sweeney, 
8 Mont. 508, the position of the United States Land De-
partment, as respects building stone and other nonmetal-
liferous deposits, was upheld. That position was confirmed 
by the United States Supreme Court in Mullen v. United 
States, 118 U.S. 271 ( 1886), and in Northern Pacific Ry. 
Co. v. Soderberg, supra. Other decisions of the Land De-
partment had recognized stone deposits as being mineral 
within the mining locations laws. M cGlenn v. Wienbroeer, 
15 L.D. 370 ( 1892); VanDoren v. Plested, 16 L.D. 508 
(1893); Bennett v. Moll, 41 L.D. 584 (1912); Stephen E. 
Day, ]r., et al., 50 L.D. 489 ( 1924). Consequently, at the 
time of the passage of the Utah statute, the decisions of the 
Federal Land Department regarding locatable minerals 
on the public domain would seem to include sand and gravel 
and other similar deposits. Further, the Oregon Supreme 
Court, as respects the locatability of the sand and gravel, 
had, in Loney v. Scott, supra, expressly ruled that sand and 
gravel was a mineral. These opinions were certainly appre-
ciated by knowledgeable members of the legal professions 
acquainted with the laws of the public domain at the time 
the Utah statute was passed. Certainly, therefore, there 
must have been an intention to give the term "mineral" as 
broad a construction as possible. 
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Although in Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 L.D. 310, the 
department had refused to recognize a mining claim based 
upon building sand which was of questionable commercial 
value, in Layman v. Ellis, 52 L.D. 714 ( 1929), the Secre-
tary of Interior for the first time gave substantial considera-
tion as to whether or not sand and gravel would be a min-
eral such that location could be made under the federal 
mining laws. The secretary relying upon the definition of 
the term mineral in Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern 
Pac. Ry. Co., 25 L.D. 233, which is the same as that in 
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, supra, ruled that 
sand and gravel would have to be deemed a mineral, 
stating: 
"* * * In these publications gravel and sand have 
uniformly been classed as a mineral resource. They 
are also included in the list of useful minerals (U.S. 
Geological Survey Bulletins, Nos. 585, 910) and min-
eral supplies (U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin No. 
666). 
"From what has been stated there can be no ques-
tion that gravel deposits are definitely classified as a 
mineral product in trade and commerce and have a 
pronounced and widespread economic value because 
of the demand therefor in trade, manufacture, or in 
the mechanical arts. 
*** 
"* * * There is no logical reason in view of the latest 
expressions of the department why, in the administra-
tion of the Federal mining laws, any discrimination 
should be made between gravel and stones of other 
kinds, which are used for practically the same or simi-
lar purposes, where the former as well as the latter 
can be extracted, removed and marketed at a profit." 
Consequently, it is apparent that in situation where the 
public domain is involved, sand and gravel has been deemed 
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to be a mineral and since the Legislature obviously intended 
that state policy on its public domain would closely follow 
that of the Federal Government, sand and gravel must be 
deemed a mineral where present in commercial quantities 
and thus reserved to the State under 65-1-15 and 16 
' U.C.A. 1953. See also United States v. Harris) 115 F.2d 
343 (5th Cir. 1940); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Assn. v. 
Garvey) 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). 
The appellant contends that since Congress by the Act of 
July 23, 1955, 69 Stat. 368, 30 U.S.C. 611, removed sand 
and gravel, stone, pumice, etc., from the mining laws so far 
as locations on the public domain is concerned, this evi-
denced a Congressional dissatisfaction with the decisions 
of the Department of Interior and the courts. This argu-
ment is non sequitur. First, the original pronouncements 
of the courts that sand and gravel, stone, etc., were min-
erals for locations under the mining laws were over 70 years 
old when Congress made the change. Thus, a long history 
of Congressional inaction in the face of administrative and 
judicial interpretation rebuts any contention that Congress 
had not intended those minerals to be included under the 
Mining Act of 1872. Secondly, Congress did not state that 
such substances were not mineral, but merely removed them 
from location. Thus, in Opinion M-36417, February 15, 
195 7, the Solicitor of the Department of Interior rendered 
an opinion that Congress did not make a determination or 
finding that sand and gravel, etc., was not mineral, but 
rather merely removed the substances from location, since 
locations of these substances for purposes other than com-
mercial exploitation (recreational and otherwise) had cre-
ated problems in the management of the public domain. 
The Solicitor noted: 
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"***The declaration that these materials shall not 
be deemed to be 'valuable mineral deposits' is expressly 
qualified by the words 'within the meaning of the 
mining laws.' The obvious purpose of this declaration 
was simply and solely to remove these minerals from 
the operation of the mining laws which in terms in-
cludes 'all valuable mineral deposits in lands belong-
ing to the United States * * *' ( 30 U.S.C. sec. 22). 
Congress has not said that such materials are not valu-
able mineral deposits within the meaning of the min-
ing laws and all other laws, but has clearly and un-
equivocably limited the application of the definition 
thus expressed. To arbitrarily ignore that limitation 
and hold that Congress has thereby determined sand 
and gravel not to be a mineral under any other law 
would be to give the act an effect which is contrary 
to its express provision. 
"The position that a declaration by Congress that 
a material is not thereafter to be locatable under the 
mining laws is ipso facto a determination of its non-
mineral character is further shown to be unwarranted 
by the fact that Congress has heretofore removed a 
number of minerals from the operation of the mining 
laws, (although using different language to obtain that 
result), without any such effect having been ascribed 
to the legislation. Certainly it cannot be said that in 
enacting the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 Congress 
has determined coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, 
oil, oil shale, and gas to be non-mineral. The effect 
of that act was to restrict the meaning of the phrase 
'all valuable minerals' as used in the mining laws. In 
removing sand and gravel from location under the 
mining laws Congress could very well have provided 
for its disposition under the Mineral Leasing Act 
rather than the Materials Act, and such action would 
obviously not be construed as a determination of its 
non-mineral character. As a matter of fact, Con-
gress might for one reason or another declare any 
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mineral now subject to the mining laws not to be 'a 
valuable mineral deposit' within the meaning of those 
laws and otherwise provide for its disposition without 
thereby determining its character as a 'mineral' one 
way or another. 
"* * * If these mineral materials in a given case 
meet the standard definition for 'valuable minerals' 
as applied to low-grade deposits they must be deemed 
valuable and being minerals they are 'valuable min-
erals' even though they are no longer such within the 
meaning of the mining law. See Solicitor's Opinion, 
M-36379 (Oct. 3, 1956). The history of Public Law 
167 bears this out since it clearly shows that the sole 
purpose of this provision of the act was to remove these 
'minerals' from the operation of the mining laws and 
to provide otherwise for their disposal. 
"If Congress has intended by Public Law 167 to 
quit-claim to surface owners deposits of sand and 
gravel theretofore reserved to the United States under 
other laws, it is reasonable to assume that appropriate 
language to effect that grant would have been in-
cluded in the act. Since grants by the United States 
are always construed most favorably to the interest of 
the grantor, the existence of such a grant must clearly 
appear. The only intent which can reasonably be 
ascribed to the action taken by Congress is that it in-
tended to transfer the disposition of deposits of sand 
and gravel owned by the United States from one set 
of laws to another. There is nothing in the act or in its 
legislative history to indicate that by virtue of its opera-
tion the United States was to lose title to any deposits 
of sand and gravel which it theretofore owned. There-
fore, deposits of sand and gravel which were the prop-
erty of the United States prior to enactment of Public 
Law 167 continue to be so and can be disposed of 
only in the manner directed by Congress." 
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It is apparent, therefore, that the appellant can take no 
comfort from the fact that in 1955 Congress for one reason 
or another saw fit to amend the mining location laws re-
specting Federal public domain. 
It is apparent from all the authorities from the various 
disciplines that sand and gravel when present in commer-
cially marketable quantities is a mineral and hence reserved 
to the State under the provisions of 65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 
1953. 
Statutory Construction 
The appellant in its brief argues that the Legislature 
could not have intended sand and gravel to be a mineral 
because in certain instances the extraction of sand and 
gravel would destroy the surface use. This overlooks the 
fact that many other forms of mineral extraction destroy 
surface uses. Placer mining itself contemplates extracting 
the mineral close to the surface by removing overburden or 
otherwise using the surface. See Yuba Investment Com-
pany v. Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields, 184 Calif. 469, 194 
Pac. 19; Trklja v. Keys, 49 Calif. App. 2d 24, 121 P.2d 54. 
Thus, in Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 116 U.S. 687, 
it was determined that placer mines by their nature involve 
the attempt to extract mineral which is generally found in 
the softer materials which cover the earth's surface and not 
underneath the earth in veins or lodes. In Clipper Mining 
Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220, the court 
noted: 
"A 'placer location' is not a location of lodes or veins 
underneath the surface, but is simply a claim of a tract 
or parcel of ground for the sake of loose deposits of 
mineral upon or near the surface. A lode or vein may 
be known to exist at the time of the placer location 
or not known until long after the patent therefore has 
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been issued. There being no necessary connection be-
tween the placer and the vein, Congress * * * has pro-
vided that in an application for a placer patent the 
applicant shall include any vein or lode of which he 
has possession, and that if he does not make such in-
clusion the omission is to be taken as a conclusive 
declaration that he has no right of possession of such 
vein or lode. If, however, no vein or lode within the 
placer claim is known to exist at the time the patent 
is issued, then the patentee takes title to any which 
may be subsequently discovered." 
As was noted in U.S. v. Schaub, supra, holding sand and 
gravel to be a mineral at the time of the passage of most of 
the acts involving the public domain, including that reserv-
ing minerals to the State of Utah, not all the minerals in the 
public domain were known nor was their particular value or 
location specified by the Legislature. The intention was to 
reserve all potential mineral wealth for use by the State. 
The fact that surface lands may be interfered with is no 
basis to preclude mineral development, since the surface 
in all forms of mineral recovery activity is to a greater or 
lesser extent impeded. Coal, when outcrops are close to the 
surface, is mined by a stripping process which completely 
destroys the surface and involves no tunnels or shafts. See 
Meiners, Strip Mining Legislation, 3 Natural Resources 
Journal, 442 ( 1964). Consequently, since the Legislature 
provided for various forms of leases and mining locations, 
65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953, it is apparent that the term "min-
eral" has no relationship to its location; rather, it is deep 
in the ground, near the surface, placer or lode. 
At the time of the passage of the reservation provisions 
(65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953), the Land Board noted 
that pursuant to the reservations, several applications for 
the purposes of prospecting and mining had been approved 
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for coal, oil, gas and asphaltum. Further, the State was 
deeply involved in the litigation in U.S. v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 
643, and was desirous of obtaining maximum value from 
mineral lands. See Reports of the State Board of Land 
Commissioners of the State of Utah, 1908-1924, Twentieth 
and Twenty-First Annual Reports, pages 7 through 11 ; 
Biennial Report 1919 and 1920, pages 9 through 12. 
Certainly where sand and gravel is so diffused in land 
that it cannot be commercially extracted or produced, it 
would not be deemed mineral. However, where it is in such 
quantity and quality that it may be extracted for its own 
sake and be produced in commercial quantities which are 
usable and sellable, it would be incongruous not to hold that 
sand and gravel was a mineral. It is submitted, therefore, 
that the legislative intent and statutory construction sup-
port sand and gravel as being a mineral. 
Although the State Department of Fish and Game may 
have undertaken other activities for the surface, this only 
demonstrates a failure of that agency to fully appreciate 
the nature of the legal interest they held and to take suffi-
cient steps before acquiring land to make certain that its 
mineral development would not interfere with the projected 
uses. 
It is submitted that the decision of the trial court holding 
that sand and gravel is a mineral within the provisions of 
65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953, should be affirmed. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 65-7-10, 
U.C.A. 1953, DID NOT REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME FOR THE MAKING 
OF ANY MINERAL LEASE BY THE LAND BOARD WHERE 
THE DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME DID NOT HOLD 
THE INTEREST LEASED. 
At the time of trial, the appellant contended that 65-7-
10, U.C.A. 1953, required that before any mineral lease 
could be let by the State Land Board, it would be necessary 
that the Department of Fish and Game give its consent. 
65-7-10 provides that mineral leases shall be made exclu-
sively by the Land Board. It thereafter provides that the 
Land Board should obtain the consent of the "state agency 
using or holding such land." It is submitted that the inten-
tion of the Legislature in enacting that provision was to 
govern the situation where a State agency owned a total fee, 
but where the lands were sought to be leased for the min-
eral interest. Since the State Land Board has substantial 
experience and special knowledge relating to the leasing of 
mineral interests, any mineral lease would be made by the 
State Land Board to insure that the lease was made in 
accordance with the best interests of the State. However, 
where the State agency did not have a complete fee, but 
merely had surface title, it would not be holding or using 
the mineral estate, and as a consequence, the State Land 
Board would not have to obtain the consent of the other 
State agency before leasing the mineral interests, the title to 
which would be in the State Land Board. 
Several things support this position. First, 65-7-10, 
U.C.A. 1953, was enacted in 1955 (Laws of Utah 1955, 
Chapter 128, Section 10). 65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953, pro-
vides that the State Land Board may issue leases for explor-
ing and producing oil and gas or for prospecting and mining 
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purposes "upon any portions of the unsold lands or mineral 
interests of the state." This provision was re-enacted in 
1959 after substantial change (Laws of Utah 1959, Chapter 
132, Section 1). Consequently, it would appear that in 
order to give harmony to both sections, 65-7-10 must be 
construed as being applicable only to the case where the 
Land Board does not own the mineral interest which is 
sought to be leased. Further, 65-1-19, U.C.A. 1953, pro-
vides: 
"The board may lease for prospecting and mining 
purposes the deposits of coal or other mineral or min-
erals that may be in lands sold with a reservation of 
mineral deposits, and may lease such deposits in un-
sold lands belonging to the state." 
This provision would apply to the situation in the instant 
case, since the State Land Board is the owner of the min-
eral interest, including the sand and gravel, which is min-
eral. Therefore, in order to construe the various provisions 
in harmony, it is apparent that the consent of the holding 
or using agency need only be obtained where the holding 
and using agency is holding or using the estate sought to be 
leased. 
Further supporting this position is the fact that subse-
quent to the 1955 enactment of 65-7-10, U.C.A. 1953, 
65-1-95, U.C.A. 1953, was enacted (Laws of Utah 1959, 
Chapter 132, Section 11). This provision provides: 
"All state agencies using or holding any state lands 
or mineral interests shall forthwith furnish the state 
land board, on forms to be provided by the board, a 
statement of the consent or non-consent of such agency 
to the issuance by the state land board of any oil and 
gas lease under the terms of this act upon such lands 
or mineral interests. * * *" 
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This section is substantially more specific than 65-7-10, 
thus supporting the conclusion that the Legislature did not 
intend 65-7-10 to be applicable to mineral interests which 
the State Land Board owned. If 65-7-10 were applicable 
to such a situation, there would have been no need for the 
enactment of 65-1-95, and further, 65-1-95 would not 
have to have been so specifically drawn to cover the situa-
tion where State agencies were using or holding any "state 
lands or mineral interests." The addition of the term "or 
mineral interests" in 65-1-95 supports the conclusion that 
65-7-10 did not apply to the case where the State agency 
merely had the surface rights and the mineral interest was 
owned by the Land Board. 
There may be situations where it would be good land 
management for the Land Board to consult with other 
State agencies before issuing mineral leases (other than 
those for oil and gas) for the mineral estate where the 
surface is owned by another department. The trial court 
recognized this in its Memorandum Decision, and stated: 
"That the State Land Board has the right to the 
sand and gravel without the consent of the State De-
partment of Fish and Game. As a matter of courtesy, 
however, the State Land Board should inform the Fish 
and Game Department of its intention to go upon the 
lands and remove the same." 
However, whether this consultation should be made a 
mandatory requirement is up to the Legislature, and it has 
not as yet made itself specific in this regard. Indeed, there 
are a number of reasons in opposition to a requirement that 
the mineral interest be leased only with the consent of the 
surface owner. The royalties derived from the leasing of 
mineral interests are trust funds held for support of the 
common schools. Duchesne County v. State Tax Commis-
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sion, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335. As a consequence, the 
trustee owes a duty to use the corpus of the trust in such a 
manner as will bring the maximum benefit to the bene-
ficiary. By allowing other State departments to restrict the 
trustee's power, the purpose of the grants under the Ena-
bling Act (Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12, 28 Stat. 107, July 
16, 1894, as implemented by 65-1-64, 65 and 67, U.C.A. 
1953) would be violated. 
Since the title to the mineral deposit of sand and gravel 
on the subject lands is in the State Land Board, and 65-7-
10, U.C.A. 1953, does not require the consent of the surface 
agency where it does not own the mineral interest, the trial 
court's ruling that the Land Board could lease the mineral 
interest without consent of the Department of Fish and 
Game should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the appellant's position as respects 
sand and gravel being a mineral is not in harmony with the 
intention of the Legislature in reserving mineral interests 
to the State. Further, it is apparent that geologists, min-
eralogists, lawyers, and judges, as well as persons of indus-
try, have long recognized sand and gravel to have a mineral 
status when it is present in commercially usable quantities. 
The broad reservation provisions of statutes relating to the 
public domain in not referring to any specific lands and 
attempting to provide for a broad policy which would have 
prospective as well as present application, would be frus-
trated by such a narrow construction as the appellant urges 
this court to adopt. It is submitted, therefore, the trial court 
correctly determined that the sand and gravel deposits pres-
ent in the subject lands were mineral and under the juris-
diction of the State Land Board. 
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Further, it is obvious that the appellant's contention to 
give unneeded authority to other State agencies over min-
eral and land interests in which they have no title cannot be 
sustained. It is apparent that the trial court's decision 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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